作者：Ran Tao; Fubing Su; Mingxing Liu; Guan
发表时间：2010-01-06
概要：
By analyzing the evolution of local governments’ roles in different periods of China’s growth in transition, this paper explores local fiscal incentives to use subsidized land and infrastructure as a key instrument in regional competition for manufacturing investment after the mid- 1990s. We relate local land development behavior to China’s current land use institutions and inter-governmental arrangements. On the basis of a panel data covering prefectural-level city from 1999 to 2003, we empirically identify and compare the fiscal impacts of different forms of land leasing (by negotiation versus by auction/tender). Policy implications are drawn from this analysis to further reform China’s urban land system and fiscal institutions.
关键词：地方财政；土地财政；race to bottom competition；land leasing by negotiation；tax haring system；local fiscal incentives
