|作 者：||Yu-Hung Hong & Alven H. S. Lam|
Hong Kong’s land-leasing system empowers the government to exercise two
important land policy measures—regulating land supply and capturing
development windfalls. This paper focuses on the evaluation of the effectiveness
of this leasehold system especially in the areas of capturing development gains
for financing urban infrastructure. The portion of development profits captured
by the government was measured through an analysis of the official
lease-negotiation cases. An average of 39 percent of the increased land value
occurring between 1970 and 1991 was captured through leasing public land.
These captured benefits plus other land related revenues accounted for 79
percent of the average annual infrastructure investment for the same period.
Despite the success in capturing development windfalls, scholars and
policymakers have engaged in a series of debates over the implications of this
land-leasing method on property prices. The dual role of the government in
regulating land use and negotiating land premiums may have created an
institutional setting that has generated imperfect competition in the real estate
market and encouraged property speculation. By undertaking an institutional
analysis, the authors establish a causal relationship between the land-value-capture
experience and high land and property prices in Hong Kong. The institutionally
oriented explanation of high housing costs—which many analysts have
neglected—would have important implications on policy recommendations for
capturing development windfalls by leasing public land in Hong Kong and elsewhere.
|关 键 词：||Land Values; Hong Kong; Leasehold System|